{"id":53,"date":"2026-06-03T16:20:17","date_gmt":"2026-06-03T20:20:17","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/pressbooks.library.torontomu.ca\/disinformationhandbook\/?post_type=chapter&p=53"},"modified":"2026-06-22T16:15:24","modified_gmt":"2026-06-22T20:15:24","slug":"empathy","status":"publish","type":"chapter","link":"https:\/\/pressbooks.library.torontomu.ca\/disinformationhandbook\/chapter\/empathy\/","title":{"raw":"Empathy","rendered":"Empathy"},"content":{"raw":"Chapter Contents<\/strong>\r\n3.1 What do we mean by \u2018empathy\u2019<\/a>\r\n3.2 Empathy in Academic Libraries<\/a>\r\n3.3 Empathy as a Path, Not a Replacement<\/a>\r\n3.4 The Role of the Library<\/a>\r\n3.5 Historical Empathy and Archival Framework<\/a>\r\n3.6 The Limits and Critiques of Empathy<\/a>\r\nReflective Questions<\/a>\r\n\r\n
\r\n\r\n

<\/a>3.1 What do we mean by \u2018empathy\u2019<\/h2>\r\nIt is essential that we define empathy clearly, lest we confuse it for sympathy or pity. The word empathy was derived by German psychologist Theodore Lipps from the term \u2018einfuhlun\u2019, literally \u201cin-feeling\u201d.[footnote]James Hardee, \u201cAn Overview of Empathy,\u201d Permanente Journal<\/em> 7, no. 4 (2003): 51.[\/footnote] In \u201cSome Thoughts on Empathy\u201d, Szalita notes that \u201cit is good to be able to put yourself into someone else\u2019s shoes, but you have to remember that you don\u2019t wear them.\u201d[footnote]Alberta B. Szalita, \u201cSome Thoughts on Empathy: The Eighteenth Annual Frieda Fromm-Reichmann Memorial Lecture,\u201d Contemporary Psychoanalysis<\/em> 37, no. 1 (January 2001): 100.[\/footnote] Sympathy, however, requires wearing another\u2019s shoes, feeling alongside and suffering with them. A sympathetic approach can quickly become laborious and draining, as the feeling is shared with the sufferer rather than the feeling being acknowledged and observed. In contrast, an empathetic approach requires \u201cengaged detachment\u201d, the ability to observe and understand feelings experienced by another without taking them on as one\u2019s own.[footnote]Hardee, \u201cAn Overview of Empathy,\u201d 53.[\/footnote]\r\n\r\nLaws details a brief history of empathy and defines it as a mode by which we \u201cunderstand and respond to other\u2019s feelings and emotions.\u201d[footnote]Ana Luisa S\u00e1nchez Laws, \u201cCan Immersive Journalism Enhance Empathy?,\u201d Digital Journalism<\/em>, 8, no. 2 (2020): 218.[\/footnote] Research in neuroscience and evolutionary biology demonstrates that empathy is a necessary tool for social engagement and \u201cempathy is the mechanism through which we gather information to cooperate with others.\u201d[footnote]Laws, \u201cCan Immersive Journalism Enhance Empathy?,\u201d 218.[\/footnote]\r\n\r\nIn The Altruism Question: Towards a Social-Psychological Answer<\/em>, Baston details the progression of the connotations of the term empathy, its definition having shifted from being a cognitively-based perspective-taking concept in clinical discussions in the 1950s to a more emotionally-based meaning in the 1960s. This emotional meaning became more specific in the late 1970s, being used to refer to emotions that are more focused on the other than on the self, virtually indistinguishable from what has been called pity, compassion or tenderness by many philosophers and early psychologists.[footnote]C. Daniel Batson, The Altruism Question\u202f: Toward a Social Psychological Answer<\/em> (Psychology Press, 2015), 86.[\/footnote]\r\n\r\nEmpathy is vastly deliberated and debated throughout literature and across multiple disciplines that it is clear that \u201cwhatever empathy is, it\u2019s important.\u201d[footnote]Amy Coplan and Peter Goldie, Empathy\u202f: Philosophical and Psychological Perspectives<\/em> (Oxford University Press, 2011), 4.\u00a0[\/footnote] For the purpose of this handbook, we are using Coplan\u2019s definition of empathy as \u201ca complex imaginative process in which an observer situated another person\u2019s situated psychological states while maintaining clear self-other differentiation.\u201d[footnote]Coplan and Goldie. Empathy\u202f: Philosophical and Psychological Perspectives<\/em>, 5.[\/footnote] It is a means to attempt to understand, value, and appreciate the feelings and perspectives of another without taking them on ourselves.\r\n\r\nEmpathy does not require an enormous outlay of emotional effort. Small statements or indications of understanding can prove to be effective means of building and maintaining a positive rapport with another.[footnote]Hardee, \u201cAn Overview of Empathy,\u201d 5.[\/footnote] In Philosophical Explorations<\/em>, Schramme maintains that one does not need to be in agreement with or endorse the perspective one is trying to understand, that it is enough merely to understand that the relevant experiences of the other are valid and worth understanding.[footnote]Thomas Schramme, \u201cEmpathy as a Means to Understand People,\u201d Philosophical Explorations<\/em> 27, no. 2 (May 2024): 162.[\/footnote]\u00a0 Even minimal understanding can enhance engagement.\r\n\r\nAs information professionals, we understand the current chaos and challenges in the information environment. We too face the difficulties of discerning truth and fact from the manipulated and out-of-context information presented to us as convincingly legitimate, and we understand how disinformation can be easily disseminated far and wide within minutes, churned out faster than one can effectively evaluate and dispel it. Add to this complex psychological, social, and emotional factors that can make learners more susceptible to disinformation, algorithms that create echo chambers preventing alternative and opposing views from being presented to people, and the commodification of content prioritizing controversy over fact and truth, and it is hard to feel anything but empathy for learners who have fallen victim to disinformation.\r\n\r\nExhibiting empathy towards learners who believe in and spread disinformation is not at the expense of teaching valuable information literacy skills or correcting false information beliefs, or with the goal of sparing ourselves potentially uncomfortable interactions. Empathy is being suggested as a tool to help us build connections and establish social capital, particularly with learners mistrustful of institutions and traditional media sources. Learners who feel defensive are unlikely to be open to new information, and \u201ctheir threshold for understanding may be lowered as their mind and body is in a state of alertness that does not foster understanding and growth.\u201d[footnote]LaTiffany Davis et al., \u201cAuthentic Connection: Engaging with Students through Empathy,\u201d portal\u202f: Libraries and the Academy <\/em>24, no. 4 (2024): 691.[\/footnote] Empathetic interactions help to build trust, making it easier for a library worker to \u201cinsert logic, factchecking, verification techniques, or critical information literacy skills into their interactions with the patron.\u201d[footnote]Stephanie Beene and Katie Greer, \u201cLibrary Workers on the Front Lines of Conspiracy Theories in the US: One Nationwide Survey,\u201d Reference Services Review<\/em> 51, nos. 3\u20134 (2023): 265.[\/footnote]\r\n

<\/a>3.2 Empathy in Academic Libraries<\/h2>\r\nAfter the 2016 US presidential election, there were a flurry of news items touting librarian ability, and potentially, their obligation to combat misinformation - they were described as \u201centering the fray, if not already on the front lines.\u201d[footnote]M. Connor Sullivan, \u201cWhy librarians can\u2019t fight fake news\u201d, Journal of Librarianship and Information Science<\/em> 51, no. 4 (2019): 1147.[\/footnote] Unfortunately, traditional solutions, like access to information and traditional information literacy methods, have yet to bear fruit in this area.\r\n\r\nThe Failure of Traditional Frameworks<\/strong>\r\n\r\nThe evolution of information literacy (IL) frameworks has reached a critical impasse. While traditional models like the CRAAP test[footnote]Sarah Blakeslee, \u201cThe CRAAP Test,\u201d LEOX Quarterly<\/em> 31 (2004): 5-6.[\/footnote] certainly serve a purpose, relevant literature and recent studies suggest these approaches \u201cdo not facilitate the identification of misinformation and disinformation\u201d[footnote]Abbey Lewis, \u201cNew Information Literacy Model for Identifying Mis\/Disinformation Falls Short of Determining and Addressing a Need,\u201d Evidence Based Library and Information Practice<\/em> 20, no. 4 (2025): 364.[\/footnote] for our current moment. In fact, existing IL frameworks are often usable in their extant state by the misinformed; movements like \u201cQAnon represent a perverted form of IL, weaponising the same values and principles that inform existing IL frameworks and models\u201d[footnote]Matthew N. Hannah, \u201cInformation Literacy in the age of internet conspiracism,\" Journal of Information Literacy<\/em> 17, no. 1 (2023): 208.[\/footnote] \u2013 utilizing skills like skepticism and primary source verification that we have championed. While our existing conceptions of information literacy frameworks can operate sufficiently in most cases, they may now require new perspectives, or alternatives like an empathetic approach, to help people who are victims of disinformation. Information literacy, in its current academic library instantiation, \u201cmay be insufficient to intervene\u201d[footnote]Hannah, \u201cInformation Literacy in the age of internet conspiracism,\u201d 207.[\/footnote] because it can treat a psychological and social phenomenon as a simple lack of data or skills. Victims of the disinformation landscape and their beliefs have \u201cproven remarkably resistant to fact-checking and IL efforts in large part because research is baked into\u201d[footnote]Hannah, \u201cInformation Literacy in the age of internet conspiracism,\u201d 208.[\/footnote] how these beliefs function and proliferate.\r\n\r\nMechanisms of Interaction with Others\u2019 Beliefs<\/strong>\r\n\r\nAs human beings, when encountering someone with a belief we want to change, according to theorists, we typically operate within a \"regard suite\":[footnote]Olivia Bailey, \u201cEmpathy, extremism, and epistemic autonomy,\u201d Philosophical Explorations<\/em> 27, no. 2, (2024): 129.[\/footnote]\r\n
    \r\n \t
  1. We consider a belief \"genuinely theirs.\"<\/li>\r\n \t
  2. We hold the believer \"responsible\" for that belief.<\/li>\r\n \t
  3. We attempt to change that belief by \u201coffering counterevidence or identifying weaknesses in their reasons for belief.[footnote]Bailey, \u201cEmpathy, extremism, and epistemic autonomy,\u201d 129.[\/footnote]<\/li>\r\n<\/ol>\r\nHowever, this assumes the learner, in our case, possesses \u201cepistemic autonomy\u201d[footnote]Bailey, \u201cEmpathy, extremism, and epistemic autonomy,\u201d throughout.[\/footnote]\u2014that they have come up with or judged these beliefs independently, including having reviewed \u201ccountervailing evidence.\u201d[footnote]Bailey, \u201cEmpathy, extremism, and epistemic autonomy,\u201d 130.[\/footnote] More likely, as with most people, their \u201cevaluation of evidence and arguments is driven largely by pre-existing beliefs, convictions or motivations, more so than critical evaluation of evidence.\u201d[footnote]Andrea Baer, \u201cWhat intellectual empathy can offer information literacy education,\u201d in Informed Societies: Why Information Literacy Matters for Citizenship, Participation and Democracy<\/em>, edited by Stephanie Goldstein (Facet, 2019), 51.[\/footnote] Many people we encounter may be incapable of this rational behaviour, either temporarily or in the long-term, due to situational and material factors - \u201c[p]eople feel threatened about events and circumstances that make them feel powerless, uncertain and unsafe, and turn to conspiracy theories in an attempt to feel better\u201d[footnote]Karen M. Douglas et al., \u201cEngaging with Conspiracy Believers,\u201d The Review of Philosophy and Psychology<\/em> (2024): 7.4.[\/footnote]; the university or college experience could be one such factor. For example, if a student has to work while in school and has less time to devote to assignments, they may be grasping for those easy-to-access conspiratorial shortcuts due to higher cognitive load - being busier or more stressed than others can limit one\u2019s capacity to analyze incoming information.[footnote]For more on the material conditions of false belief, see: Aranzazu Vinas et al., \u201cScarcity Affects Cognitive Biases: The Case of the Illusion of Causality,\u201d Acta Psychologica<\/em> 239, no. 104007 (September 2023);\u00a0 Jennifer Crocker et al., \u201cBelief in U.S. Government Conspiracies Against Blacks among Black and White College Students: Powerlessness or System Blame?,\u201d Personality & Social Psychology Bulletin<\/em> 25, no. 8 (1999); Ted Goertze, \u201cBelief in Conspiracy Theories,\u201d Political Psychology<\/em> 15, no. 4 (1994); Jais Adam-Troian et al., \u201cOf precarity and conspiracy: Introducing a socio-functional model of conspiracy beliefs,\u201d British Journal of Social Psychology<\/em> 62, supp. 1 (2023); Salvador Casara et al., \u201cThe Impact of Economic Inequality on Conspiracy Beliefs,\u201d Journal of Experimental Social Psychology<\/em> 98, no. 104245 (January 2022); Zhao\u2010Xie Zeng et al., \u201cHow does economic inequality shape conspiracy theories? Empirical evidence from China,\u201d British Journal of Social Psychology <\/em>63, no. 2 (2024); Adam Enders et al., \u201cThe sociodemographic correlates of conspiracism,\u201d Scientific Reports<\/em> 14, no. 1 (2024).[\/footnote] When a student approaches us with a reality-distorted belief, they require a different kind of engagement,[footnote]Bailey, \u201cEmpathy, extremism, and epistemic autonomy,\u201d 130.[\/footnote] one rooted in empathy rather than a purely adversarial presentation of facts.\r\n\r\nBeyond the \"Bubble\" Myth<\/strong>\r\n\r\nThere is a common misconception that conspiratorial thinkers always exist in a bubble. In reality, learners in higher education are confronted with opposing viewpoints daily - in class and at their academic institutions in general. Those with conspiratorial views \u201care often exquisitely cognizant of the fact that others have different beliefs and have at least heard others express reasons for their competing convictions\u201d[footnote]Bailey, \u201cEmpathy, extremism, and epistemic autonomy,\u201d 133.[\/footnote]: they have heard the arguments and simply rejected them. Access to the internet and university resources ensures they are not isolated from the truth, but rather tends towards self-inoculation against it, maintaining those beliefs. Additionally, even though a learner may not be in an information bubble, \u201cconspiracist mistrust of authority figures and institutions goes hand-in-hand with an overreliance on first-hand observation and experience.\u201d[footnote]Yvonne M. Eadon, \u201c(Not) Part of the System: Resolving Epistemic Disconnect Through Archival Reference,\u201d Knowledge Organization<\/em> 47, no. 6 (2020): 444.[\/footnote] No matter how much contradictory information they are exposed to, they may not trust it over what they can experience themselves.\r\n

    <\/a>3.3 Empathy as a Path, Not a Replacement<\/h2>\r\nOur goal is not to replace the encouragement of critical thinking, but to use empathy to understand why a student might be susceptible to rejecting it in the first place. We must acknowledge that education alone cannot bridge the gap created by conspiratorial thinking. As library workers, it is not necessarily our job to deradicalize or dissuade students of their beliefs, but we must recognize when those beliefs lead to unhelpful information behaviors, or why those beliefs have been put in place of a more objective or rational way of engaging with information.\r\n\r\nEmpathy is a powerful tactic because it does not require means-testing the learner in front of you. Whether they are struggling with a basic citation or deeply entrenched in an anti-truth ideology, empathy can be a useful universal baseline. We often underestimate the chasm between those who embrace logic and those with extremist views[footnote]Bailey, \u201cEmpathy, extremism, and epistemic autonomy,\u201d 129.[\/footnote]; empathy allows us to stand in that gap without judgment. We need not sort out which learners would need an empathetic approach - empathy, as a rising tide, lifts all boats.\u00a0 In general, empathy in the academic library would include things like the following: clear goal setting for instruction, achievable learning objectives, relationship building by making an effort to know and be known by students, taking an interest in student work generally and how their work relates to their personal interests and background, and encouraging follow up or second appointments.[footnote]Davis et al., \u201cAuthentic Connection: Engaging Students through Empathy,\u201d 697.[\/footnote] It can also be helpful to use methods identified in deradicalization scholarship as ways to assist someone in turning away from those beliefs. Practical methods for the empathetic approach are discussed later in this handbook.\r\n

    <\/a>3.4 The Role of the Library<\/h2>\r\nBy pivoting toward empathy, the academic library goes beyond a repository of facts and becomes a place to build community. Community building is a dual-purpose tool: it fosters belonging while simultaneously creating a defense against the isolation that fuels disinformation. That belonging is important - you and the learner you are interacting with are two human beings who both look into things. As Eadon puts it: \u201cWe need not necessarily understand exactly where an individual is coming from, but if we as researchers ourselves and\/or as reference personnel begin to understand some of the similarities between the kind of research we do and the kind that suspicious and conspiracy researchers do (the enjoyability of the hunt, the satisfaction of perceiving connections, a desire to subvert hegemonic paradigms within and outside of our discipline), then perhaps we can start to welcome this community of researchers as \u2018researchers first.\u2019\u201d[footnote]Eadon, \u201c(Not) Part of the System: Resolving Epistemic Disconnect Through Archival Reference,\u201d 458.[\/footnote] This may seem counterintuitive, but this mental shift can help library workers make a difference by framing our trustworthiness as similarity. We should strive, through empathetic practices, to foster human connection, care for learners, and learner support so that learners \u201cfeel safer exploring new concepts and displaying vulnerability by asking questions. Emotional needs must be met before new information can adequately be conveyed.\u201d[footnote]Davis, \u201cAuthentic Connection: Engaging Students through Empathy,\u201d 691.[\/footnote] Academic libraries are in an advantageous position when it comes to empathy and the community building process - we often see learners regularly over longer periods of time, staying with them through their academic journey, or we develop long term relationships with other university workers such as faculty, creating community inside and outside the research sphere. While traditional views might say we are in an advantageous position because of our emphasis on critical thinking or fact checking abilities, the shift away from that hierarchical thinking towards community is where our strength may lie. While maintaining our core strengths of providing information and emphasizing critical thinking, it is important to remember the nature of social epistemology - that \u201cknowing and believing are not simply individual cognitive processes but fundamentally based on participation in cultures, communities, and social practices.\u201d[footnote]Lawrence J. Kirmayer, \u201cThe fragility of truth: Social epistemology in a time of polazication and pandemic,\u201d Transcultural Psychiatry<\/em> 61, no. 5 (2024): 701.[\/footnote]\r\n

    <\/a>3.5 Historical Empathy and Archival Framework<\/h2>\r\nArchival methods in critical thinking are also useful for librarians and archivists as ways to implement empathy with disinformation in the library and archives when thinking about the past. Karn defines this approach to historical inquiry as historical empathy, which she defines as \u201can approach to teaching history focused on understanding the thoughts, feelings, experiences, decisions, and actions of people from the past within specific historical contexts.\u201d[footnote]Sara Karn, \u201cHistorical Empathy: A Cognitive-Affective Theory for History Education in Canada,\u201d Canadian Journal of Education\/Revue Canadienne de l\u2019\u00e9ducation<\/em> 46, no. 1 (2022): 82.[\/footnote] Karn goes on to identify five cognitive and affective elements that she posits should be taught in history education, which are \u201c(1) evidence and contextualization, (2) informed historical imagination, (3) historical perspectives, (4) ethical judgements, and (5) caring\u201d (Karn, 2022, p. 86).[footnote]Karn, \u201cHistorical Empathy: A Cognitive-Affective Theory for History Education in Canada,\u201d 86.[\/footnote] These elements of critical thinking map very well to primary source analysis questions and could be useful for librarians to point to when analyzing historical sources with library users.\r\n\r\n \r\n\r\nBelow is a list of sample primary source questions in archival critical theory as mapped to Karn\u2019s suggested cognitive and affective methods for education. These questions can be used when analysing any source, whether during research or during the reference interview.\r\n\r\n \r\n
      \r\n \t
    1. Evidence and contextualization\r\n