{"id":70,"date":"2026-06-16T08:43:37","date_gmt":"2026-06-16T12:43:37","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/pressbooks.library.torontomu.ca\/disinformationhandbook\/?post_type=chapter&p=70"},"modified":"2026-06-22T16:06:28","modified_gmt":"2026-06-22T20:06:28","slug":"2-0-disinformation","status":"publish","type":"chapter","link":"https:\/\/pressbooks.library.torontomu.ca\/disinformationhandbook\/chapter\/2-0-disinformation\/","title":{"raw":"Disinformation","rendered":"Disinformation"},"content":{"raw":"Chapter Contents<\/strong>\r\n\r\n2.1 What is \u201cDisinformation\u201d and Why Focus On It?<\/a>\r\n2.2 The Current Disinformation Context<\/a>\r\n2.3 Why Do People Use Disinformative Sources?<\/a>\r\n2.4 Library-Specific Issues Related to Disinformation<\/a>\r\nReflective Questions<\/a>\r\n\r\n
\r\n\r\n<\/a>2.1 What is \u201cDisinformation\u201d and Why Focus On It?\r\n\r\nDisinformation is information that is \u201cdeliberately created to mislead, harm, or manipulate.\u201d[footnote]\u201cMisinformation<\/a>,\u201d Deakin University Libraries, last updated Apr 16, 2026.[\/footnote]\r\n\r\nDisinformation can be contextualised as one type of false information among several; this graphic from Deakin University Library differentiates between misinformation, disinformation, malinformation, and their level of harmful intent.\r\n

\"Chart<\/p>\r\nThis graphic from Deakin University plots different types of information, including factual and false information and nonharmful and harmul.\r\n\r\n \r\n\r\nAs this chart shows, misinformation, disinformation, and malinformation are all types of false information, and in conversation, can sometimes be used interchangeably because it is challenging to know the intention behind why information was shared. This handbook focuses on disinformation because it is important to draw learners\u2019 attention to the fact that some information is purposely, rather than inadvertently, false. While misinformation is a more commonly used term and remains a useful concept, it does not capture that false information can be spread by bad actors. By highlighting the harm that disinformation causes, we also connect to the idea of empathy for victims of disinformation, shifting blame that we might hold to disinformation agents. This handbook also describes the ways that information platforms elevate false information over genuine information, and how this situation can be exploited by bad actors.\r\n

\r\n

Types of False Information: An Example<\/strong><\/em><\/p>\r\n\r\n<\/header>\r\n

\r\n\r\nWhile it is useful to know about different types of false information, it can be challenging to differentiate between them in practice. For example, let\u2019s consider the health claim that \u201cblueberries are a superfood.\u201d This claim could be both sincerely held by wellness enthusiasts and simultaneously pushed by health influencers who knowingly sell ineffective supplements. Intent is not always clear. This handbook focuses on disinformation because it highlights the presence of bad actors and the harmful impacts of false information. A focus on disinformation alerts us to the threats that exist in the information landscape, which, in this example, are health and wellness scammers, and enables us to cultivate empathy for those who are targeted. This shifts the blame from the person who believed false information (who wouldn\u2019t like to live longer simply by eating blueberries?) to those that knowingly share harmful lies. It also enables us to consider the challenges inherent in the health information landscape: this is a very complex area with evolving research, and one that many people care deeply about, because it touches on their personal narratives of self. This in part explains why areas where there may be a modest amount of research on a topic (such as the health impact of blueberries) can be blown up disproportionately (as with the term \u201csuperfood.\u201d). When faced with information that changes rapidly, it is easy for false information to proliferate and for bad actors to take advantage. Our current information landscape also favours short form content, such as social media posts and sensational news headlines (\u201cblueberries are a superfood!\u201d), and nuanced long form content, such as a research paper, often does not have the same popular impact.\r\n\r\n<\/div>\r\n<\/div>\r\n

<\/a>2.2 The Current Disinformation Context<\/h2>\r\nDisinformation has always been a part of the information landscape. From rulers who use political propaganda about their conquests to intimidate neighbouring civilizations[footnote]Philip M. Taylor, Munitions of the Mind: A History of Propaganda from the Ancient World to the Present Day<\/em>, 3rd ed. (Manchester University Press, 2003).[\/footnote], to politically motivated false news sources that existed before the idea of objectivity in reporting[footnote]Jacob Soll, \u201cThe Long and Brutal History of Fake News<\/a>,\u201d POLITICO Magazine<\/em> (2016).[\/footnote], to the longstanding American fascination with conspiracy theories,[footnote]Matthew N. Hannah, \u201cInformation Literacy in the Age of Internet Conspiracism,\u201d Journal of Information Literacy<\/em> 17, no.1 (2023): 207.[\/footnote] disinformation is not new. The nature of truth has been debated for millenia, including among ancient Greek philosophers.[footnote]For example, see Plato\u2019s works: Theaetetus<\/em>, Gorgias<\/em>, and The Republic<\/em>, Books VI and VII.[\/footnote] However, the current information landscape faces particular challenges. Specifically, the rise of populism coupled with political disenfranchisement,[footnote]Timothy Snyder, On Tyranny: Twenty Lessons from the Twentieth Century<\/em> (Random House Publishing Group, 2017).[\/footnote] the rise in anti-intellectualism demonstrated by a loss of trust in traditional institutions[footnote]Alice E. Marwick and William Clyde Partin, \u201cConstructing Alternative Facts: Populist Expertise and the QAnon Conspiracy.\u201d New Media & Society<\/em> 26, no. 5 (2024): 2540.[\/footnote], and an increase in polarization[footnote]Justin Ling, Far and Widening: The Rise of Polarization in Canada<\/em> (Public Policy Forum, 2023).[\/footnote] make this a fraught time for learners. According to Statistics Canada, \u201c[i]n 2023, 59% of Canadians reported being very or extremely concerned about misinformation online and 43% of Canadians found it harder to distinguish between true and false news or information compared to three years prior.\u201d[footnote]Helen Foran et al. Concern about Misinformation: Connections to Trust in Media, Confidence in Institutions, Civic Engagement, and Hopefulness<\/em>. Statistics Canada, 2025.[\/footnote] In this \u201cpost-truth\u201d era, \u201ctech companies, products (like AI), and platforms like X have chipped away at and undermined our confidence in the nature of \u2018truth,\u2019 and in the institutions once entrusted to arbitrate it, and left a vacuum in its place.\u201d[footnote]\u200b\u200bBrian Merchant. \u201cAbolish the Senses<\/a>.\u201d Blood in the Machine <\/em>(blog). January 16, 2026.[\/footnote]\r\n\r\n \r\n\r\nIn the past several years there has also been a significant rise in conspiracism, which Hannah calls \u201carguably the most dangerous information crisis of our time.\u201d[footnote]Hannah, \u201cInformation Literacy in the Age of Internet Conspiracism,\u201d 207.[\/footnote] One reason that these alternative worldviews are appealing is because they replace complex, nuanced, and worrying sets of facts that have no clear narrative cohesion with a simple counternarrative. For example, in early 2020, very little was known about the COVID-19 virus, news reports were conflicting, and the death rates were very alarming -\u00a0 a conspiracy theory that was comforting for some was to believe that there was no virus and no death. Of course, beliefs like this had the effect of causing greater spread of the virus and have been called \u201cinfodemics\u201d by the World Health Organization.[footnote]For a definition of infodemic and related information, see: World Health Organization. n.d. \u201cInfodemic<\/a>.\u201d[\/footnote] Conspiracy communities such as QAnon are also welcoming social spaces of shared knowledge production, where group and individual expertise is valued over that of traditional news media and higher education, with mottos such as \u201cdo the research\u201d.[footnote]Marwick and Partin, \u201cConstructing Alternative Facts: Populist Expertise and the QAnon Conspiracy,\u201d 2547.[\/footnote] The appeal of spaces for QAnon research suggests the importance of affect to the nature of research, and the need to engage in literacy strategies which consider learners\u2019 emotions and social needs.[footnote]Matthew N. Hannah et al., \u201cA Mindfulness-Based Information Literacy Framework for the Current Information Environment,\u201d Journal of Information Literacy<\/em> 18, no. 2 (2024): 37\u201355.[\/footnote]\r\n
\r\n\r\nPost-Truth<\/strong>\r\n\r\nIt\u2019s worth spending a little time defining and contextualising the term post-truth. This was Oxford Dictionaries\u2019 Word of the Year in 2016, which they defined as an adjective: \u201crelating to or denoting circumstances in which objective facts are less influential in shaping public opinion than appeals to emotion and personal belief.\u201d The term had existed for decades before, but it was highlighted in that year because of the context of rising falsehoods in major political moments, such as Brexit and the election of Donald Trump, where the \u201cnew implication\u201d was \u201cthat truth itself has become irrelevant.\u201d[footnote]Oxford Languages, \u201cOxford Word of the Year 2016<\/a>,\u201d Archived.[\/footnote] In this sense, a \u201cpost-truth\u201d time is akin to other periods of time such as \u201cThe Enlightenment,\u201d which describe the relative valuation of facts to emotion. In The Post-Truth Condition<\/em>, Kattumana and Truwant provide an overview of the post-truth landscape drawing from a broad array of disciplines, focusing on changes in epistemology and how shifting attitudes towards the truth come to bear on our current political landscape.[footnote]Tarun Kattumana and Simon Truwant, The Post-Truth Condition: Philosophical Reflections<\/em> (Lexington Books, 2024).[\/footnote] While the term \u201cpost-truth\u201d is sometimes used to describe a context in which truth is obsolete, this volume shows that current scholarship on this topic is more nuanced and complex than this, arguing for updates to conceptions of what we know and how we know it, but not rejecting the concept of objective reality outright. There are also scholars who argue that denials of objective reality are a tool of authoritarian governments, which is why we see the rise in post-truth today. For example, see Synder\u2019s work On Tyranny<\/em> where he argues that \u201cpost-truth is pre-fascism\u201d (page 71)[footnote]Timothy Snyder, On Tyranny<\/em>.[\/footnote] and Finchelstein\u2019s A Brief History of Fascist Lies.[footnote]Federico Finchelstein, A Brief History of Fascist Lies<\/em> (University of California Press, 2022).[\/footnote] <\/em>\r\n\r\n \r\n\r\nFor a short introduction to the topic of post-truth, the article \u201cBruno Latour, the Post-Truth Philosopher, Mounts a Defense of Science\u201d provides a useful entry-point. In it, Latour is described as having \u201chad done more than that of any other living thinker to unsettle the traditional understanding of how we acquire knowledge of what\u2019s real.\u201d[footnote]Ava Kofman, \u201cBruno Latour, the Post-Truth Philosopher, Mounts a Defense of Science,\u201d The New York Times Magazine<\/em> (October 25, 2018).[\/footnote] He did so as a central figure in establishing the field of Science and Technology Studies, which examines the subjectivity that goes into scientific constructions of knowledge. Latour\u2019s work argued that instead of facts existing \u201cout there\u201d as was commonly understood, \u201cscientific facts should instead be seen as a product of scientific inquiry.\u201d He argued that \u201cthere is no such thing as a view from nowhere and that we are always implicated in the creation of our view.\u201d Despite this, as Latour\u2019s work and the article make clear, Latour believed in reality and in the importance of establishing facts through science, dedicating the latter portion of his life to amplifying climate change research. Latour\u2019s work did not cause \u201cour current post-truth moment,\u201d but rather, his work described a shift that was already underway from a \u201cshared\u201d view in a \u201ccommon world.\u201d This shift provides rich opportunities for disinformation actors to make political gains. They can discredit scientific research by claiming it is unsettled, point to the subjectivity of science as a negative, and claim the authority of their own poor quality \u201cjunk science.\u201d Despite these challenges, Latour and other STS philosophers do not urge a return to the authority of \u201ccapital S-science,\u201d but rather an embrace of the shift \u201cfrom scientists appealing to transcendent, capital-T Truth to touting the robust networks through which truth is, and has always been, established.\u201d In other words, for Latour and the other STS scholars, we should understand science and other forms of knowledge creation as situated, subjective, political, networked - and because of these characteristics, rather than in spite of them, capable of producing facts.\r\n\r\n<\/div>\r\nThe impact of disinformation has been significant. According to the Council of Canadian Academies, which focused their research on science and health information, false information impacts us both individually and collectively: \u201cOn an individual level, it can leave us vulnerable to baseless fears, harm from preventable diseases, and exploitation by those who promote misinformation for profit or power. On a collective level, it erodes trust, fosters hate, undermines social cohesion, and diminishes our capacity for collective action.\u201d[footnote]Council of Canadian Academies, Fault Lines<\/em>: Expert Panel on the Socioeconomic Impacts of Science and Health Misinformation<\/em><\/a> (CCA, 2022).[\/footnote] Trust has been eroded in news media, and in 2023, \u201cfewer than half of Canadians (47%) reported high levels of trust in the media.\u201d[footnote]Foran et al. Concern about Misinformation<\/em>.[\/footnote] As Hannah et. al. note, the contemporary media infrastructure \u201cexacerbates outrage, mis\/disinformation, and conspiracism,\u201d and its combination with growing political partisanship \u201chas produced a toxic environment in which democratic norms and processes are under increasing threat, not only from foreign adversaries, but from within the democratic institutions themselves.\u201d[footnote]Hannah et al., \u201cA Mindfulness-Based Information Literacy Framework for the Current Information Environment,\u201d 5.[\/footnote] This level of disenfranchisement is a breeding ground for nihilism and disconnection amongst learners. This apathy itself can be used as a tool, as was the case with Cambridge Analytica who identified apathetic Facebook users and manipulated them not to vote in the 2016 USA election (201).[footnote]Aram Sinnreich and Jesse Gilbert, The Secret Life of Data: Navigating Hype and Uncertainty in the Age of Algorithmic Surveillance<\/em> (MIT Press, Information Society Series, 2024).[\/footnote] The Cambridge Analytica scandal is useful to consider because it was the first public anti-democratic disinformation campaign many had seen. Of course, there have been many others before and after, but it still exemplifies how disinformation targeted at individuals can have a global impact. From voter disenfranchisement, to climate change,[footnote]Kate Cell, \u201cDisinformation Undermines Our Right to Science<\/a>,\u201d The Equation <\/em>(blog), December 15, 2025.[\/footnote] to the spread of pandemics, disinformation is shaping our world.\r\n

<\/a>2.3 Why Do People Use Disinformative Sources?<\/h2>\r\nIf disinformation sources are harmful, why do educated and discerning people use them? To understand why this happens and to cultivate empathy for those that fall victim to disinformation, it can be useful to take stock of a few issues within our information ecosystem. First, information platform technologies capitalize on our attention through a model referred to as the \u201cattention economy.\u201d[footnote]Chris Hayes, The Sirens\u2019 Call: How Attention Became the World\u2019s Most Endangered Resource<\/em>. (Random House, 2025).[\/footnote] The longer users remain glued to their devices and the more content they ingest, the more data that platforms are able to harvest and advertising they are able to sell.[footnote]Shoshana Zuboff, The Age of Surveillance Capitalism: The Fight for a Human Future at the New Frontier of Power<\/em>, 1st ed. (PublicAffairs, 2019).[\/footnote] This creates an asymmetric information environment where content that prompts high engagement, including emotional, controversial, and conspiratorial information, is naturally favoured by the platforms through recommendation algorithms.[footnote]Mike Pepi, Against Platforms: Surviving Digital Utopia<\/em> (Melville House Publishing, 2025).[\/footnote] This has been documented in phenomena such as radicalization through YouTube\u2019s recommended videos algorithm, where users \u201cconsistently migrate from milder to more extreme content\u201d (131).[footnote]Manoel Horta Ribeiro et al., \u201cAuditing Radicalization Pathways on YouTube\u201d (Conference paper, Proceedings of the 2020 Conference on Fairness, Accountability, and Transparency, New York, NY, USA, January 27, 2020), 131\u201341.[\/footnote] The most popular online shows are currently right-leaning,[footnote]Kayla Gogarty, \u201cThe Right Dominates the Online Media Ecosystem, Seeping into Sports, Comedy, and Other Supposedly Nonpolitical Spaces,\u201d Media Matters for America<\/em>. March 14, 2025.[\/footnote] and many of those shows are promoters of conspiracism, which reflects asymmetric recommendations. Pathways to extreme content might be considered a byproduct of the platforms\u2019 need to generate attention, but can certainly be exploited by bad actors who want to participate in the rising tide of conspiracism.\r\n
\r\n\r\nDisinformation and The Algorithm<\/strong>\r\n\r\nThe way that extremist content tends to rise to the top of recommendation algorithms can be exploited by bad actors. For example, if a conspiracy theorist YouTuber wanted to bring in more engagement for their extreme content channel, they might create videos on a popular topic to gain subscribers and placement on mainstream recommended video lists. This is why a busy home cook who is looking for a recipe for yogurt can end up inadvertently watching content from a white supremacist creator they are ideologically opposed to and then is recommended hateful disinformation in the future. White supremacists have long considered the internet a powerful tool for recruitment, being early operators of message boards and disinformation websites.[footnote]Christopher J. Lennings, \u201cGrooming for Terror: The Internet and Young People,\u201d Psychiatry, Psychology and Law<\/em> 17, no. 3 (2010): 424\u201337.[\/footnote]\r\n\r\n<\/div>\r\nThe collection and sale of user data to advertisers as the basis for how technology platforms function is often considered a trade-off for convenience. Many enjoy being recommended content based on their past behaviour and preferences, such as Spotify\u2019s algorithmically recommended music playlists. But not only does this open the door to extremist pipelines, it enables highly targeted advertising in a manner that can be considered exploitative. For example, Facebook has been accused of serving ads related to weight loss and beauty products to teen girls who had recently deleted a selfie, an indicator of low self-esteem.[footnote]Rounak Majumdar, \u201cMeta Accused of Targeting Vulnerable Teens with Ads Based on Emotional States<\/a>.\u201d TechStory<\/em>, April 10, 2025.[\/footnote] Although capitalizing on girls and women\u2019s self esteem issues in order to sell products is a longstanding practice of the beauty industry, online advertising that can be immediately delivered to a targeted audience is a characteristic of technology platforms. Indeed, when data brokers sell access to users for advertising, it is common practice to divide them into categories that reveal personal health, adversity, and sexual information. As Veliz states, \u201cthe most sensitive categories are very often the most valuable because if they know where you hurt, if they know what you\u2019re scared of, then they can really kind of exploit that information\u201d.[footnote]\u201cCarissa Veliz: Exposing Big Tech, Privacy Threats & The Future of Artificial Intelligence<\/a>,\u201d podcast. Posted March 4, 2024, by Through Conversations Podcast, YouTube, 51 min., 8 sec.[\/footnote] Presumably, hurt, scared, and vulnerable users make an easy target for exploitation.\r\n\r\nUsers also feel powerless in response to this sort of invasion of privacy. Leaving platforms has what Doctorow calls a high \u201cswitching cost,\u201d as leaving a platform like Facebook would require either leaving all of your friends and communities there or requiring the coordination of a mass exodus.[footnote]Cory Doctorow, The Internet Con: How to Seize the Means of Computation<\/em> (Verso, 2023), 26[\/footnote] As a result, users are locked in to platforms that no longer serve their needs. Knowing that users can\u2019t leave has prompted many platforms to \u201censhittify,\u201d or reduce the value they deliver to their users in order to boost their own profits.[footnote]Cory Doctorow, Enshittification: Why Everything Suddenly Got Worse and What to Do about It<\/em> (Verso, 2025).[\/footnote] For example, Google searches used to produce more relevant results, but Google has begun a deliberate strategy of reducing result relevancy in order to boost how many searches a user must run and, correspondingly, generate more advertising sales.[footnote]Doctorow, Enshittification<\/em>, 178[\/footnote] The artificial elevation of poor results can also be seen on other platforms, such as Facebook downgrading content from friends in favour of advertising and Amazon\u2019s top results highlighting paid product placement.[footnote]Doctorow, Enshittification, <\/em>11-28.[\/footnote] As this is the trend with the big technology companies, other online platforms which might be more common sources of information have also followed suit. Poor relevancy information is thus being increasingly built into our information systems.\r\n\r\nTechnology platforms enshittify to better squeeze their users. Within the information landscape, we have also seen other sources of information become degraded for a variety of complex reasons. For instance, traditional news media has been on the decline for several decades and local news has been all but hollowed out;[footnote]April Lindgren et al., \u201cCanada\u2019s Local News \u2018Poverty<\/a>,\u2019\u201d Policy Options<\/em>, January 23, 2017.[\/footnote] once reputable government sources in the United States have been politicized;[footnote]For example, Nicola Hawley describes the degradation of public health institutions in the USA in her article \u201cWhose Health? Whose Truth? Navigating the \u2018Make America Healthy Again\u2019 \u2013 Public Health Divide.\u201d Annals of Human Biology<\/em> 52, no. 1.[\/footnote] and experts that once held authority are entangled in criminal scandals.[footnote]For example, well known academics such as Noam Chomsky have been implicated in the Epstein Files; see Ramon Antonio Vargas, \u201cNewly Released Files Shed New Light on Chomsky and Epstein Relationship<\/a>,\u201d The Guardian<\/em>, February 3, 2026.[\/footnote] In other words, some traditional sources of authority are not as stable as they once were, and sources must be assessed individually. This evaluation is an exhausting process, which can lead to the dismissal of whole categories of information sources, as is normative in the far-right distrust of news media.[footnote]For example, X, formerly Twitter, autoreplied with the statement \u201cLegacy Media Lies\u201d to all enquiries about the conduct of its AI agent Grok producing non-consensual CSAM. See: Lora Kolodny and Samantha Subin, \u201cMusk\u2019s xAI Faces Backlash after Grok Generates Sexualized Images of Children on X<\/a>,\u201d CNBC<\/em>, January 2, 2026.[\/footnote] Disinformation agents capitalize on precisely this erosion in public trust.\r\n\r\nGiven the uphill battle that users must face to find good quality information when they are being directed towards radicalization pipelines, targeted by advertisements when vulnerable, fed low relevancy results on purpose, and the degradation of traditional information sources, it\u2019s not surprising that people use disinformation. As a result of the asymmetric push platforms provide towards disinformation, it\u2019s a statistical inevitability that a certain percentage of the population will be subject to it, including library workers and learners. Disinformation impacts everyone, because we all rely on information systems that are vulnerable to manipulation. Learning is an affective process that can be exploited by bad actors. Given this, it\u2019s difficult not <\/em>to feel empathetic for learners impacted by disinformation.\r\n
\r\n\r\nDisinformation and Uncertainty<\/strong>\r\n\r\nUncertainty can breed disinformation. For example, the uncertainty produced by the COVID-19 pandemic spawned many conspiracy theories, including about the origin of the virus, effective treatments, and government plots. In response, science educators and public health officials have revised their communications strategies to include more empathetic approaches, as these are thought to be effective at countering disinformation.[footnote]Carly M. Goldstein et al., \u201cScience Communication in the Age of Misinformation,\u201d Annals of Behavioral Medicine 54, no. 12 (2020): 985\u201390.[\/footnote]\r\n\r\n<\/div>\r\nIn addition to these challenges, members of marginalized communities face additional hurdles in accessing reliable information sources. Campaigns against disinformation have often focused on vilifying alternative media and valorizing establishment sources. However, this messaging alienates communities who do not trust those sources due to historic and ongoing oppression. For example, Benjamin in Viral Justice <\/em>describes examples of medicalized torture Black people in America have been subjected to, such as the U.S. Public Health Service Syphilis Study (in which Black men in Tuskegee were untreated for a treatable disease), the gynecological experiments of J. Marion Sims on unanesthetized enslaved women, and the medical establishment\u2019s betrayal of Henrietta Lacks.[footnote]Ruha Benjamin, Viral Justice\u202f: How We Grow the World We Want<\/em> (Princeton University Press, 2022).[\/footnote] Mistrust of health institutions is a logical result of this history, but Benjamin states that \u201cthe problem is not simply a \u2018lack of trust\u2019 on the part of the downtrodden but a lack of trustworthiness on the part of dominant institutions\u201d (227). Benjamin\u2019s focus is on the experiences of Black Americans, but one could write similar descriptions of mistrust in other abusive contexts, focusing for instance on Indigenous people and the Canadian child welfare system or women\u2019s experiences with law enforcement and sexual assault reporting. As library workers, the more that we can learn about the oppression of marginalized groups, the better our understanding of how the information sources we work with are perceived as trustworthy (or not) by these communities.\r\n
\r\n\r\nAlternative Information Avenues<\/strong>\r\n\r\nAlternative sources of information outside of the mainstream can be more appealing to oppressed communities, who have not had a positive relationship with institutional sources. Benjamin writes how some salons and barbershops are partnering with public health researchers to deliver information more effectively. Due to their importance in Black life, these businesses are well positioned to share health information with the community. This is an example of community-based health information positioning and requires a high degree of empathy from the stylists and barbers to work effectively.[footnote]Benjamin, Viral Justice\u202f: How We Grow the World We Want,<\/em> 251[\/footnote]\r\n\r\n<\/div>\r\n

<\/a>2.4 Library-Specific Issues Related to Disinformation<\/h2>\r\nWhile misinformation impacts everyone, as academic library workers our frequent interactions with younger people has given us a particular cause for concern in this area, and with good reason. While Gen Z are often referred to as digital natives, a recent study by YouGov found only 11% of 18-29 year olds received a high score on a task identifying fake news from real, while 36% received a low score, as compared to only 9% of those over 65.[footnote]Conor Murray, \u201cGen Z And Millennials More Likely To Fall For Fake News Than Older People, Test Finds<\/a>,\u201d Forbes<\/em>, June 28, 2023.[\/footnote] Many students will not be as savvy with disinformation as we may assume, and the sheer volume of information they come across, the speed at which they view it, and the rapidity of its spread, makes it impossible for them to remain critical of everything.[footnote]Jane Kelly, \u201cResearch Finds Gen Z, Millennials More Vulnerable to Fake News<\/a>,\u201d UVAToday<\/em>, September 6, 2024.[\/footnote] With 74% of Gen Z getting news from social media daily,[footnote]Media Insight Project, \u201cThe news consumption habits of 16- to 40-year-olds<\/a>,\u201d American Press Institute<\/em>, August 31, 2022.[\/footnote] source reliability and high exposure to poor news sources add to the concerns. Complicating this further, more information is available than anyone can reasonably evaluate critically, psychological factors such as confirmation bias, selective exposure, emotional appeals, social proof, cognitive laziness, and the overwhelming information environment, lead all of us to seek out, absorb, and recall information that reinforces our existing beliefs.[footnote]Bolaji David Oladokun and Millie Nne Horsfall, Fake News and Misinformation on Social Media: The Role of Librarians in Fake News and Information Disorder in the Era of Advanced Information Technology<\/em> (Walkter de Gruyter, 2025), 162-163.[\/footnote] Finally, while learners are confident in their ability to identify disinformation, they often lack the critical evaluation skills to be effective.[footnote]Nicole Johnston, \u201cThe Impact and Management of Mis\/Disinformation at University Libraries in Australia,\u201d Journal of the Australian Library and Information Association<\/em> 72, no.3 (2023): 253.[\/footnote] All of this adds up to create an information system for learners that combines high risk of disinformation with low capacity for identifying it.\r\n
\r\n\r\nAge and Disinformation<\/strong>\r\n\r\nThe American Press Institute found that, though Gen Z do regularly check traditional news sources, they are still prone to getting their news from social media than any other source, consuming, on average \u201cnews from about four social media platforms at least weekly\u201d.[footnote]Media Insight Project, \u201cThe news consumption habits of 16- to 40-year-olds.\u201d[\/footnote] Given the established prevalence of misinformation in social media, traditional methods or information literacy are inadequate.\r\n\r\n<\/div>\r\nSince the meteoric rise of disinformation around 2016, and the sharp increase in disinformation during the pandemic, librarians have been increasingly at the forefront of tackling the issue, particularly digital misinformation. Passion for the issue among library workers is unsurprising, as it is \u201cin opposition to traditional library values and services\u201d.[footnote]M. Connor Sullivan, \u201cWhy Librarians Can\u2019t Fight Fake News,\u201d Journal of Librarianship and Information Science<\/em> 51, no. 4 (2019): 1148.[\/footnote] In academic libraries, this work often involves instruction sessions and the creation of library guides, both focused on information evaluation skills, which rely heavily on step by step processes like the CRAAP test.[footnote]Johnston, \u201cImpact and Management,\" 252-253.[\/footnote] The sheer volume of information students are presented with daily, however, make these processes impractical and unlikely to be employed consistently with every individual interaction with a suspect source. Librarians also face a number of additional obstacles in counteracting misinformation with students: methods of spreading misinformation are evolving extremely quickly; time and resources are short, institutional support is lacking, and the issue is complex.[footnote]Johnston, \u201cImpact and Management,\" 263.[\/footnote] So, how can library workers best assist learners with these limitations, if the tools we have relied on are not working? It might start with relationship building by addressing the shame that many students feel when reaching out for help or information.\r\n\r\nShame and library anxiety are linked and well documented.[footnote]Erin McAfee, \u201cShame: The Emotional Basis of Library Anxiety,\u201d College & Research Libraries <\/em>79 no. 2 (2018): 237.[\/footnote] Similar to general library anxiety, students may well have anxiety and shame around not understanding the impact of disinformation or how to identify it. In a study conducted in 2015, students used words like \u201cscary, overpowering, lost, helpless, confused, and fear of the unknown\u201d[footnote]Constance Mellon, \u201cLibrary Anxiety: A Grounded Theory and Its Development,\u201d College & Research Libraries <\/em>76, no. 3 (1986): 162.[\/footnote] in their reflections about research and using the library. The study further found that students feel shame around their incompetence in the library[footnote]Mellon, \u201cLibrary Anxiety\u201d, 163.[\/footnote], a feeling that likely extends to their difficulty in navigating misinformation. If students feel judged or criticised when seeking help, this could increase shame and discourage students from using the library entirely. In fact, a validation scale developed by Bostick in 1992 identified interactions with staff as one of four factors contributing to library anxiety.[footnote]Sharon Lee Bostick, \u201cThe Development and Validation of the Library Anxiety Scale,\u201d PhD diss., (Wayne State University, 1992).[\/footnote] Each mishandled interaction with students at these vulnerable moments, including when they have a lack of understanding about misinformation, could serve to increase shame and reluctance to seek help.\r\n\r\nTo develop successful interventions for students, understanding how and why biases develop and when and how people fall victim to misinformation is key. It is dangerous to label people as lazy or uneducated if they are susceptible to misinformation. We are wired to believe information that is given to us, and without sustained focused attention on all information that comes in, it\u2019s impossible to avoid.[footnote]Sullivan, \u201cWhy Librarians Can\u2019t,\u201d 1152[\/footnote] Keeping these obstacles that students face everyday in mind during each interaction is key; we need to approach students with empathy.\r\n
\r\n

<\/a>Reflective Questions<\/strong><\/p>\r\n\r\n<\/header>\r\n

\r\n\r\nWhat is the difference between misinformation, disinformation, and malinformation? When is it helpful to distinguish between them?\r\n\r\nHow often do you use recommendation algorithms to find content, such as the videos that are recommended after you finish watching a video on YouTube? Have you ever encountered disinformation through a recommendation algorithm?\r\n\r\nReflect on the marginalized communities that you work with. Have they experienced oppression which would lead them to be distrustful of institutional sources of information, such as government or academia? If you aren\u2019t sure, how could you learn?\r\n\r\nHave you ever fallen for disinformation? Consider how and when this occurred and the factors that influenced this occurrence.\r\n\r\nHow do online information systems fail information seekers? How do they tilt the playing field towards disinformation?\r\n\r\n<\/div>\r\n<\/div>\r\n ","rendered":"

Chapter Contents<\/strong><\/p>\n

2.1 What is \u201cDisinformation\u201d and Why Focus On It?<\/a>
\n2.2 The Current Disinformation Context<\/a>
\n2.3 Why Do People Use Disinformative Sources?<\/a>
\n2.4 Library-Specific Issues Related to Disinformation<\/a>
\nReflective Questions<\/a><\/p>\n

\n

<\/a>2.1 What is \u201cDisinformation\u201d and Why Focus On It?<\/p>\n

Disinformation is information that is \u201cdeliberately created to mislead, harm, or manipulate.\u201d[1]<\/sup><\/a><\/p>\n

Disinformation can be contextualised as one type of false information among several; this graphic from Deakin University Library differentiates between misinformation, disinformation, malinformation, and their level of harmful intent.<\/p>\n

\"Chart<\/p>\n

This graphic from Deakin University plots different types of information, including factual and false information and nonharmful and harmul.<\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

As this chart shows, misinformation, disinformation, and malinformation are all types of false information, and in conversation, can sometimes be used interchangeably because it is challenging to know the intention behind why information was shared. This handbook focuses on disinformation because it is important to draw learners\u2019 attention to the fact that some information is purposely, rather than inadvertently, false. While misinformation is a more commonly used term and remains a useful concept, it does not capture that false information can be spread by bad actors. By highlighting the harm that disinformation causes, we also connect to the idea of empathy for victims of disinformation, shifting blame that we might hold to disinformation agents. This handbook also describes the ways that information platforms elevate false information over genuine information, and how this situation can be exploited by bad actors.<\/p>\n

\n
\n

Types of False Information: An Example<\/strong><\/em><\/p>\n<\/header>\n

\n

While it is useful to know about different types of false information, it can be challenging to differentiate between them in practice. For example, let\u2019s consider the health claim that \u201cblueberries are a superfood.\u201d This claim could be both sincerely held by wellness enthusiasts and simultaneously pushed by health influencers who knowingly sell ineffective supplements. Intent is not always clear. This handbook focuses on disinformation because it highlights the presence of bad actors and the harmful impacts of false information. A focus on disinformation alerts us to the threats that exist in the information landscape, which, in this example, are health and wellness scammers, and enables us to cultivate empathy for those who are targeted. This shifts the blame from the person who believed false information (who wouldn\u2019t like to live longer simply by eating blueberries?) to those that knowingly share harmful lies. It also enables us to consider the challenges inherent in the health information landscape: this is a very complex area with evolving research, and one that many people care deeply about, because it touches on their personal narratives of self. This in part explains why areas where there may be a modest amount of research on a topic (such as the health impact of blueberries) can be blown up disproportionately (as with the term \u201csuperfood.\u201d). When faced with information that changes rapidly, it is easy for false information to proliferate and for bad actors to take advantage. Our current information landscape also favours short form content, such as social media posts and sensational news headlines (\u201cblueberries are a superfood!\u201d), and nuanced long form content, such as a research paper, often does not have the same popular impact.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n

<\/a>2.2 The Current Disinformation Context<\/h2>\n

Disinformation has always been a part of the information landscape. From rulers who use political propaganda about their conquests to intimidate neighbouring civilizations[2]<\/sup><\/a>, to politically motivated false news sources that existed before the idea of objectivity in reporting[3]<\/sup><\/a>, to the longstanding American fascination with conspiracy theories,[4]<\/sup><\/a> disinformation is not new. The nature of truth has been debated for millenia, including among ancient Greek philosophers.[5]<\/sup><\/a> However, the current information landscape faces particular challenges. Specifically, the rise of populism coupled with political disenfranchisement,[6]<\/sup><\/a> the rise in anti-intellectualism demonstrated by a loss of trust in traditional institutions[7]<\/sup><\/a>, and an increase in polarization[8]<\/sup><\/a> make this a fraught time for learners. According to Statistics Canada, \u201c[i]n 2023, 59% of Canadians reported being very or extremely concerned about misinformation online and 43% of Canadians found it harder to distinguish between true and false news or information compared to three years prior.\u201d[9]<\/sup><\/a> In this \u201cpost-truth\u201d era, \u201ctech companies, products (like AI), and platforms like X have chipped away at and undermined our confidence in the nature of \u2018truth,\u2019 and in the institutions once entrusted to arbitrate it, and left a vacuum in its place.\u201d[10]<\/sup><\/a><\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

In the past several years there has also been a significant rise in conspiracism, which Hannah calls \u201carguably the most dangerous information crisis of our time.\u201d[11]<\/sup><\/a> One reason that these alternative worldviews are appealing is because they replace complex, nuanced, and worrying sets of facts that have no clear narrative cohesion with a simple counternarrative. For example, in early 2020, very little was known about the COVID-19 virus, news reports were conflicting, and the death rates were very alarming –\u00a0 a conspiracy theory that was comforting for some was to believe that there was no virus and no death. Of course, beliefs like this had the effect of causing greater spread of the virus and have been called \u201cinfodemics\u201d by the World Health Organization.[12]<\/sup><\/a> Conspiracy communities such as QAnon are also welcoming social spaces of shared knowledge production, where group and individual expertise is valued over that of traditional news media and higher education, with mottos such as \u201cdo the research\u201d.[13]<\/sup><\/a> The appeal of spaces for QAnon research suggests the importance of affect to the nature of research, and the need to engage in literacy strategies which consider learners\u2019 emotions and social needs.[14]<\/sup><\/a><\/p>\n

\n

Post-Truth<\/strong><\/p>\n

It\u2019s worth spending a little time defining and contextualising the term post-truth. This was Oxford Dictionaries\u2019 Word of the Year in 2016, which they defined as an adjective: \u201crelating to or denoting circumstances in which objective facts are less influential in shaping public opinion than appeals to emotion and personal belief.\u201d The term had existed for decades before, but it was highlighted in that year because of the context of rising falsehoods in major political moments, such as Brexit and the election of Donald Trump, where the \u201cnew implication\u201d was \u201cthat truth itself has become irrelevant.\u201d[15]<\/sup><\/a> In this sense, a \u201cpost-truth\u201d time is akin to other periods of time such as \u201cThe Enlightenment,\u201d which describe the relative valuation of facts to emotion. In The Post-Truth Condition<\/em>, Kattumana and Truwant provide an overview of the post-truth landscape drawing from a broad array of disciplines, focusing on changes in epistemology and how shifting attitudes towards the truth come to bear on our current political landscape.[16]<\/sup><\/a> While the term \u201cpost-truth\u201d is sometimes used to describe a context in which truth is obsolete, this volume shows that current scholarship on this topic is more nuanced and complex than this, arguing for updates to conceptions of what we know and how we know it, but not rejecting the concept of objective reality outright. There are also scholars who argue that denials of objective reality are a tool of authoritarian governments, which is why we see the rise in post-truth today. For example, see Synder\u2019s work On Tyranny<\/em> where he argues that \u201cpost-truth is pre-fascism\u201d (page 71)[17]<\/sup><\/a> and Finchelstein\u2019s A Brief History of Fascist Lies.[18]<\/sup><\/a> <\/em><\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

For a short introduction to the topic of post-truth, the article \u201cBruno Latour, the Post-Truth Philosopher, Mounts a Defense of Science\u201d provides a useful entry-point. In it, Latour is described as having \u201chad done more than that of any other living thinker to unsettle the traditional understanding of how we acquire knowledge of what\u2019s real.\u201d[19]<\/sup><\/a> He did so as a central figure in establishing the field of Science and Technology Studies, which examines the subjectivity that goes into scientific constructions of knowledge. Latour\u2019s work argued that instead of facts existing \u201cout there\u201d as was commonly understood, \u201cscientific facts should instead be seen as a product of scientific inquiry.\u201d He argued that \u201cthere is no such thing as a view from nowhere and that we are always implicated in the creation of our view.\u201d Despite this, as Latour\u2019s work and the article make clear, Latour believed in reality and in the importance of establishing facts through science, dedicating the latter portion of his life to amplifying climate change research. Latour\u2019s work did not cause \u201cour current post-truth moment,\u201d but rather, his work described a shift that was already underway from a \u201cshared\u201d view in a \u201ccommon world.\u201d This shift provides rich opportunities for disinformation actors to make political gains. They can discredit scientific research by claiming it is unsettled, point to the subjectivity of science as a negative, and claim the authority of their own poor quality \u201cjunk science.\u201d Despite these challenges, Latour and other STS philosophers do not urge a return to the authority of \u201ccapital S-science,\u201d but rather an embrace of the shift \u201cfrom scientists appealing to transcendent, capital-T Truth to touting the robust networks through which truth is, and has always been, established.\u201d In other words, for Latour and the other STS scholars, we should understand science and other forms of knowledge creation as situated, subjective, political, networked – and because of these characteristics, rather than in spite of them, capable of producing facts.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

The impact of disinformation has been significant. According to the Council of Canadian Academies, which focused their research on science and health information, false information impacts us both individually and collectively: \u201cOn an individual level, it can leave us vulnerable to baseless fears, harm from preventable diseases, and exploitation by those who promote misinformation for profit or power. On a collective level, it erodes trust, fosters hate, undermines social cohesion, and diminishes our capacity for collective action.\u201d[20]<\/sup><\/a> Trust has been eroded in news media, and in 2023, \u201cfewer than half of Canadians (47%) reported high levels of trust in the media.\u201d[21]<\/sup><\/a> As Hannah et. al. note, the contemporary media infrastructure \u201cexacerbates outrage, mis\/disinformation, and conspiracism,\u201d and its combination with growing political partisanship \u201chas produced a toxic environment in which democratic norms and processes are under increasing threat, not only from foreign adversaries, but from within the democratic institutions themselves.\u201d[22]<\/sup><\/a> This level of disenfranchisement is a breeding ground for nihilism and disconnection amongst learners. This apathy itself can be used as a tool, as was the case with Cambridge Analytica who identified apathetic Facebook users and manipulated them not to vote in the 2016 USA election (201).[23]<\/sup><\/a> The Cambridge Analytica scandal is useful to consider because it was the first public anti-democratic disinformation campaign many had seen. Of course, there have been many others before and after, but it still exemplifies how disinformation targeted at individuals can have a global impact. From voter disenfranchisement, to climate change,[24]<\/sup><\/a> to the spread of pandemics, disinformation is shaping our world.<\/p>\n

<\/a>2.3 Why Do People Use Disinformative Sources?<\/h2>\n

If disinformation sources are harmful, why do educated and discerning people use them? To understand why this happens and to cultivate empathy for those that fall victim to disinformation, it can be useful to take stock of a few issues within our information ecosystem. First, information platform technologies capitalize on our attention through a model referred to as the \u201cattention economy.\u201d[25]<\/sup><\/a> The longer users remain glued to their devices and the more content they ingest, the more data that platforms are able to harvest and advertising they are able to sell.[26]<\/sup><\/a> This creates an asymmetric information environment where content that prompts high engagement, including emotional, controversial, and conspiratorial information, is naturally favoured by the platforms through recommendation algorithms.[27]<\/sup><\/a> This has been documented in phenomena such as radicalization through YouTube\u2019s recommended videos algorithm, where users \u201cconsistently migrate from milder to more extreme content\u201d (131).[28]<\/sup><\/a> The most popular online shows are currently right-leaning,[29]<\/sup><\/a> and many of those shows are promoters of conspiracism, which reflects asymmetric recommendations. Pathways to extreme content might be considered a byproduct of the platforms\u2019 need to generate attention, but can certainly be exploited by bad actors who want to participate in the rising tide of conspiracism.<\/p>\n

\n

Disinformation and The Algorithm<\/strong><\/p>\n

The way that extremist content tends to rise to the top of recommendation algorithms can be exploited by bad actors. For example, if a conspiracy theorist YouTuber wanted to bring in more engagement for their extreme content channel, they might create videos on a popular topic to gain subscribers and placement on mainstream recommended video lists. This is why a busy home cook who is looking for a recipe for yogurt can end up inadvertently watching content from a white supremacist creator they are ideologically opposed to and then is recommended hateful disinformation in the future. White supremacists have long considered the internet a powerful tool for recruitment, being early operators of message boards and disinformation websites.[30]<\/sup><\/a><\/p>\n<\/div>\n

The collection and sale of user data to advertisers as the basis for how technology platforms function is often considered a trade-off for convenience. Many enjoy being recommended content based on their past behaviour and preferences, such as Spotify\u2019s algorithmically recommended music playlists. But not only does this open the door to extremist pipelines, it enables highly targeted advertising in a manner that can be considered exploitative. For example, Facebook has been accused of serving ads related to weight loss and beauty products to teen girls who had recently deleted a selfie, an indicator of low self-esteem.[31]<\/sup><\/a> Although capitalizing on girls and women\u2019s self esteem issues in order to sell products is a longstanding practice of the beauty industry, online advertising that can be immediately delivered to a targeted audience is a characteristic of technology platforms. Indeed, when data brokers sell access to users for advertising, it is common practice to divide them into categories that reveal personal health, adversity, and sexual information. As Veliz states, \u201cthe most sensitive categories are very often the most valuable because if they know where you hurt, if they know what you\u2019re scared of, then they can really kind of exploit that information\u201d.[32]<\/sup><\/a> Presumably, hurt, scared, and vulnerable users make an easy target for exploitation.<\/p>\n

Users also feel powerless in response to this sort of invasion of privacy. Leaving platforms has what Doctorow calls a high \u201cswitching cost,\u201d as leaving a platform like Facebook would require either leaving all of your friends and communities there or requiring the coordination of a mass exodus.[33]<\/sup><\/a> As a result, users are locked in to platforms that no longer serve their needs. Knowing that users can\u2019t leave has prompted many platforms to \u201censhittify,\u201d or reduce the value they deliver to their users in order to boost their own profits.[34]<\/sup><\/a> For example, Google searches used to produce more relevant results, but Google has begun a deliberate strategy of reducing result relevancy in order to boost how many searches a user must run and, correspondingly, generate more advertising sales.[35]<\/sup><\/a> The artificial elevation of poor results can also be seen on other platforms, such as Facebook downgrading content from friends in favour of advertising and Amazon\u2019s top results highlighting paid product placement.[36]<\/sup><\/a> As this is the trend with the big technology companies, other online platforms which might be more common sources of information have also followed suit. Poor relevancy information is thus being increasingly built into our information systems.<\/p>\n

Technology platforms enshittify to better squeeze their users. Within the information landscape, we have also seen other sources of information become degraded for a variety of complex reasons. For instance, traditional news media has been on the decline for several decades and local news has been all but hollowed out;[37]<\/sup><\/a> once reputable government sources in the United States have been politicized;[38]<\/sup><\/a> and experts that once held authority are entangled in criminal scandals.[39]<\/sup><\/a> In other words, some traditional sources of authority are not as stable as they once were, and sources must be assessed individually. This evaluation is an exhausting process, which can lead to the dismissal of whole categories of information sources, as is normative in the far-right distrust of news media.[40]<\/sup><\/a> Disinformation agents capitalize on precisely this erosion in public trust.<\/p>\n

Given the uphill battle that users must face to find good quality information when they are being directed towards radicalization pipelines, targeted by advertisements when vulnerable, fed low relevancy results on purpose, and the degradation of traditional information sources, it\u2019s not surprising that people use disinformation. As a result of the asymmetric push platforms provide towards disinformation, it\u2019s a statistical inevitability that a certain percentage of the population will be subject to it, including library workers and learners. Disinformation impacts everyone, because we all rely on information systems that are vulnerable to manipulation. Learning is an affective process that can be exploited by bad actors. Given this, it\u2019s difficult not <\/em>to feel empathetic for learners impacted by disinformation.<\/p>\n

\n

Disinformation and Uncertainty<\/strong><\/p>\n

Uncertainty can breed disinformation. For example, the uncertainty produced by the COVID-19 pandemic spawned many conspiracy theories, including about the origin of the virus, effective treatments, and government plots. In response, science educators and public health officials have revised their communications strategies to include more empathetic approaches, as these are thought to be effective at countering disinformation.[41]<\/sup><\/a><\/p>\n<\/div>\n

In addition to these challenges, members of marginalized communities face additional hurdles in accessing reliable information sources. Campaigns against disinformation have often focused on vilifying alternative media and valorizing establishment sources. However, this messaging alienates communities who do not trust those sources due to historic and ongoing oppression. For example, Benjamin in Viral Justice <\/em>describes examples of medicalized torture Black people in America have been subjected to, such as the U.S. Public Health Service Syphilis Study (in which Black men in Tuskegee were untreated for a treatable disease), the gynecological experiments of J. Marion Sims on unanesthetized enslaved women, and the medical establishment\u2019s betrayal of Henrietta Lacks.[42]<\/sup><\/a> Mistrust of health institutions is a logical result of this history, but Benjamin states that \u201cthe problem is not simply a \u2018lack of trust\u2019 on the part of the downtrodden but a lack of trustworthiness on the part of dominant institutions\u201d (227). Benjamin\u2019s focus is on the experiences of Black Americans, but one could write similar descriptions of mistrust in other abusive contexts, focusing for instance on Indigenous people and the Canadian child welfare system or women\u2019s experiences with law enforcement and sexual assault reporting. As library workers, the more that we can learn about the oppression of marginalized groups, the better our understanding of how the information sources we work with are perceived as trustworthy (or not) by these communities.<\/p>\n

\n

Alternative Information Avenues<\/strong><\/p>\n

Alternative sources of information outside of the mainstream can be more appealing to oppressed communities, who have not had a positive relationship with institutional sources. Benjamin writes how some salons and barbershops are partnering with public health researchers to deliver information more effectively. Due to their importance in Black life, these businesses are well positioned to share health information with the community. This is an example of community-based health information positioning and requires a high degree of empathy from the stylists and barbers to work effectively.[43]<\/sup><\/a><\/p>\n<\/div>\n

<\/a>2.4 Library-Specific Issues Related to Disinformation<\/h2>\n

While misinformation impacts everyone, as academic library workers our frequent interactions with younger people has given us a particular cause for concern in this area, and with good reason. While Gen Z are often referred to as digital natives, a recent study by YouGov found only 11% of 18-29 year olds received a high score on a task identifying fake news from real, while 36% received a low score, as compared to only 9% of those over 65.[44]<\/sup><\/a> Many students will not be as savvy with disinformation as we may assume, and the sheer volume of information they come across, the speed at which they view it, and the rapidity of its spread, makes it impossible for them to remain critical of everything.[45]<\/sup><\/a> With 74% of Gen Z getting news from social media daily,[46]<\/sup><\/a> source reliability and high exposure to poor news sources add to the concerns. Complicating this further, more information is available than anyone can reasonably evaluate critically, psychological factors such as confirmation bias, selective exposure, emotional appeals, social proof, cognitive laziness, and the overwhelming information environment, lead all of us to seek out, absorb, and recall information that reinforces our existing beliefs.[47]<\/sup><\/a> Finally, while learners are confident in their ability to identify disinformation, they often lack the critical evaluation skills to be effective.[48]<\/sup><\/a> All of this adds up to create an information system for learners that combines high risk of disinformation with low capacity for identifying it.<\/p>\n

\n

Age and Disinformation<\/strong><\/p>\n

The American Press Institute found that, though Gen Z do regularly check traditional news sources, they are still prone to getting their news from social media than any other source, consuming, on average \u201cnews from about four social media platforms at least weekly\u201d.[49]<\/sup><\/a> Given the established prevalence of misinformation in social media, traditional methods or information literacy are inadequate.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

Since the meteoric rise of disinformation around 2016, and the sharp increase in disinformation during the pandemic, librarians have been increasingly at the forefront of tackling the issue, particularly digital misinformation. Passion for the issue among library workers is unsurprising, as it is \u201cin opposition to traditional library values and services\u201d.[50]<\/sup><\/a> In academic libraries, this work often involves instruction sessions and the creation of library guides, both focused on information evaluation skills, which rely heavily on step by step processes like the CRAAP test.[51]<\/sup><\/a> The sheer volume of information students are presented with daily, however, make these processes impractical and unlikely to be employed consistently with every individual interaction with a suspect source. Librarians also face a number of additional obstacles in counteracting misinformation with students: methods of spreading misinformation are evolving extremely quickly; time and resources are short, institutional support is lacking, and the issue is complex.[52]<\/sup><\/a> So, how can library workers best assist learners with these limitations, if the tools we have relied on are not working? It might start with relationship building by addressing the shame that many students feel when reaching out for help or information.<\/p>\n

Shame and library anxiety are linked and well documented.[53]<\/sup><\/a> Similar to general library anxiety, students may well have anxiety and shame around not understanding the impact of disinformation or how to identify it. In a study conducted in 2015, students used words like \u201cscary, overpowering, lost, helpless, confused, and fear of the unknown\u201d[54]<\/sup><\/a> in their reflections about research and using the library. The study further found that students feel shame around their incompetence in the library[55]<\/sup><\/a>, a feeling that likely extends to their difficulty in navigating misinformation. If students feel judged or criticised when seeking help, this could increase shame and discourage students from using the library entirely. In fact, a validation scale developed by Bostick in 1992 identified interactions with staff as one of four factors contributing to library anxiety.[56]<\/sup><\/a> Each mishandled interaction with students at these vulnerable moments, including when they have a lack of understanding about misinformation, could serve to increase shame and reluctance to seek help.<\/p>\n

To develop successful interventions for students, understanding how and why biases develop and when and how people fall victim to misinformation is key. It is dangerous to label people as lazy or uneducated if they are susceptible to misinformation. We are wired to believe information that is given to us, and without sustained focused attention on all information that comes in, it\u2019s impossible to avoid.[57]<\/sup><\/a> Keeping these obstacles that students face everyday in mind during each interaction is key; we need to approach students with empathy.<\/p>\n

\n
\n

<\/a>Reflective Questions<\/strong><\/p>\n<\/header>\n

\n

What is the difference between misinformation, disinformation, and malinformation? When is it helpful to distinguish between them?<\/p>\n

How often do you use recommendation algorithms to find content, such as the videos that are recommended after you finish watching a video on YouTube? Have you ever encountered disinformation through a recommendation algorithm?<\/p>\n

Reflect on the marginalized communities that you work with. Have they experienced oppression which would lead them to be distrustful of institutional sources of information, such as government or academia? If you aren\u2019t sure, how could you learn?<\/p>\n

Have you ever fallen for disinformation? Consider how and when this occurred and the factors that influenced this occurrence.<\/p>\n

How do online information systems fail information seekers? How do they tilt the playing field towards disinformation?<\/p>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n

 <\/p>\n

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  3. Jacob Soll, \u201cThe Long and Brutal History of Fake News<\/a>,\u201d POLITICO Magazine<\/em> (2016). ↵<\/a><\/li>
  4. Matthew N. Hannah, \u201cInformation Literacy in the Age of Internet Conspiracism,\u201d Journal of Information Literacy<\/em> 17, no.1 (2023): 207. ↵<\/a><\/li>
  5. For example, see Plato\u2019s works: Theaetetus<\/em>, Gorgias<\/em>, and The Republic<\/em>, Books VI and VII. ↵<\/a><\/li>
  6. Timothy Snyder, On Tyranny: Twenty Lessons from the Twentieth Century<\/em> (Random House Publishing Group, 2017). ↵<\/a><\/li>
  7. Alice E. Marwick and William Clyde Partin, \u201cConstructing Alternative Facts: Populist Expertise and the QAnon Conspiracy.\u201d New Media & Society<\/em> 26, no. 5 (2024): 2540. ↵<\/a><\/li>
  8. Justin Ling, Far and Widening: The Rise of Polarization in Canada<\/em> (Public Policy Forum, 2023). ↵<\/a><\/li>
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  10. \u200b\u200bBrian Merchant. \u201cAbolish the Senses<\/a>.\u201d Blood in the Machine <\/em>(blog). January 16, 2026. ↵<\/a><\/li>
  11. Hannah, \u201cInformation Literacy in the Age of Internet Conspiracism,\u201d 207. ↵<\/a><\/li>
  12. For a definition of infodemic and related information, see: World Health Organization. n.d. \u201cInfodemic<\/a>.\u201d ↵<\/a><\/li>
  13. Marwick and Partin, \u201cConstructing Alternative Facts: Populist Expertise and the QAnon Conspiracy,\u201d 2547. ↵<\/a><\/li>
  14. Matthew N. Hannah et al., \u201cA Mindfulness-Based Information Literacy Framework for the Current Information Environment,\u201d Journal of Information Literacy<\/em> 18, no. 2 (2024): 37\u201355. ↵<\/a><\/li>
  15. Oxford Languages, \u201cOxford Word of the Year 2016<\/a>,\u201d Archived. ↵<\/a><\/li>
  16. Tarun Kattumana and Simon Truwant, The Post-Truth Condition: Philosophical Reflections<\/em> (Lexington Books, 2024). ↵<\/a><\/li>
  17. Timothy Snyder, On Tyranny<\/em>. ↵<\/a><\/li>
  18. Federico Finchelstein, A Brief History of Fascist Lies<\/em> (University of California Press, 2022). ↵<\/a><\/li>
  19. Ava Kofman, \u201cBruno Latour, the Post-Truth Philosopher, Mounts a Defense of Science,\u201d The New York Times Magazine<\/em> (October 25, 2018). ↵<\/a><\/li>
  20. Council of Canadian Academies, Fault Lines<\/em>: Expert Panel on the Socioeconomic Impacts of Science and Health Misinformation<\/em><\/a> (CCA, 2022). ↵<\/a><\/li>
  21. Foran et al. Concern about Misinformation<\/em>. ↵<\/a><\/li>
  22. Hannah et al., \u201cA Mindfulness-Based Information Literacy Framework for the Current Information Environment,\u201d 5. ↵<\/a><\/li>
  23. Aram Sinnreich and Jesse Gilbert, The Secret Life of Data: Navigating Hype and Uncertainty in the Age of Algorithmic Surveillance<\/em> (MIT Press, Information Society Series, 2024). ↵<\/a><\/li>
  24. Kate Cell, \u201cDisinformation Undermines Our Right to Science<\/a>,\u201d The Equation <\/em>(blog), December 15, 2025. ↵<\/a><\/li>
  25. Chris Hayes, The Sirens\u2019 Call: How Attention Became the World\u2019s Most Endangered Resource<\/em>. (Random House, 2025). ↵<\/a><\/li>
  26. Shoshana Zuboff, The Age of Surveillance Capitalism: The Fight for a Human Future at the New Frontier of Power<\/em>, 1st ed. (PublicAffairs, 2019). ↵<\/a><\/li>
  27. Mike Pepi, Against Platforms: Surviving Digital Utopia<\/em> (Melville House Publishing, 2025). ↵<\/a><\/li>
  28. Manoel Horta Ribeiro et al., \u201cAuditing Radicalization Pathways on YouTube\u201d (Conference paper, Proceedings of the 2020 Conference on Fairness, Accountability, and Transparency, New York, NY, USA, January 27, 2020), 131\u201341. ↵<\/a><\/li>
  29. Kayla Gogarty, \u201cThe Right Dominates the Online Media Ecosystem, Seeping into Sports, Comedy, and Other Supposedly Nonpolitical Spaces,\u201d Media Matters for America<\/em>. March 14, 2025. ↵<\/a><\/li>
  30. Christopher J. Lennings, \u201cGrooming for Terror: The Internet and Young People,\u201d Psychiatry, Psychology and Law<\/em> 17, no. 3 (2010): 424\u201337. ↵<\/a><\/li>
  31. Rounak Majumdar, \u201cMeta Accused of Targeting Vulnerable Teens with Ads Based on Emotional States<\/a>.\u201d TechStory<\/em>, April 10, 2025. ↵<\/a><\/li>
  32. \u201cCarissa Veliz: Exposing Big Tech, Privacy Threats & The Future of Artificial Intelligence<\/a>,\u201d podcast. Posted March 4, 2024, by Through Conversations Podcast, YouTube, 51 min., 8 sec. ↵<\/a><\/li>
  33. Cory Doctorow, The Internet Con: How to Seize the Means of Computation<\/em> (Verso, 2023), 26 ↵<\/a><\/li>
  34. Cory Doctorow, Enshittification: Why Everything Suddenly Got Worse and What to Do about It<\/em> (Verso, 2025). ↵<\/a><\/li>
  35. Doctorow, Enshittification<\/em>, 178 ↵<\/a><\/li>
  36. Doctorow, Enshittification, <\/em>11-28. ↵<\/a><\/li>
  37. April Lindgren et al., \u201cCanada\u2019s Local News \u2018Poverty<\/a>,\u2019\u201d Policy Options<\/em>, January 23, 2017. ↵<\/a><\/li>
  38. For example, Nicola Hawley describes the degradation of public health institutions in the USA in her article \u201cWhose Health? Whose Truth? Navigating the \u2018Make America Healthy Again\u2019 \u2013 Public Health Divide.\u201d Annals of Human Biology<\/em> 52, no. 1. ↵<\/a><\/li>
  39. For example, well known academics such as Noam Chomsky have been implicated in the Epstein Files; see Ramon Antonio Vargas, \u201cNewly Released Files Shed New Light on Chomsky and Epstein Relationship<\/a>,\u201d The Guardian<\/em>, February 3, 2026. ↵<\/a><\/li>
  40. For example, X, formerly Twitter, autoreplied with the statement \u201cLegacy Media Lies\u201d to all enquiries about the conduct of its AI agent Grok producing non-consensual CSAM. See: Lora Kolodny and Samantha Subin, \u201cMusk\u2019s xAI Faces Backlash after Grok Generates Sexualized Images of Children on X<\/a>,\u201d CNBC<\/em>, January 2, 2026. ↵<\/a><\/li>
  41. Carly M. Goldstein et al., \u201cScience Communication in the Age of Misinformation,\u201d Annals of Behavioral Medicine 54, no. 12 (2020): 985\u201390. ↵<\/a><\/li>
  42. Ruha Benjamin, Viral Justice\u202f: How We Grow the World We Want<\/em> (Princeton University Press, 2022). ↵<\/a><\/li>
  43. Benjamin, Viral Justice\u202f: How We Grow the World We Want,<\/em> 251 ↵<\/a><\/li>
  44. Conor Murray, \u201cGen Z And Millennials More Likely To Fall For Fake News Than Older People, Test Finds<\/a>,\u201d Forbes<\/em>, June 28, 2023. ↵<\/a><\/li>
  45. Jane Kelly, \u201cResearch Finds Gen Z, Millennials More Vulnerable to Fake News<\/a>,\u201d UVAToday<\/em>, September 6, 2024. ↵<\/a><\/li>
  46. Media Insight Project, \u201cThe news consumption habits of 16- to 40-year-olds<\/a>,\u201d American Press Institute<\/em>, August 31, 2022. ↵<\/a><\/li>
  47. Bolaji David Oladokun and Millie Nne Horsfall, Fake News and Misinformation on Social Media: The Role of Librarians in Fake News and Information Disorder in the Era of Advanced Information Technology<\/em> (Walkter de Gruyter, 2025), 162-163. ↵<\/a><\/li>
  48. Nicole Johnston, \u201cThe Impact and Management of Mis\/Disinformation at University Libraries in Australia,\u201d Journal of the Australian Library and Information Association<\/em> 72, no.3 (2023): 253. ↵<\/a><\/li>
  49. Media Insight Project, \u201cThe news consumption habits of 16- to 40-year-olds.\u201d ↵<\/a><\/li>
  50. M. Connor Sullivan, \u201cWhy Librarians Can\u2019t Fight Fake News,\u201d Journal of Librarianship and Information Science<\/em> 51, no. 4 (2019): 1148. ↵<\/a><\/li>
  51. Johnston, \u201cImpact and Management,\" 252-253. ↵<\/a><\/li>
  52. Johnston, \u201cImpact and Management,\" 263. ↵<\/a><\/li>
  53. Erin McAfee, \u201cShame: The Emotional Basis of Library Anxiety,\u201d College & Research Libraries <\/em>79 no. 2 (2018): 237. ↵<\/a><\/li>
  54. Constance Mellon, \u201cLibrary Anxiety: A Grounded Theory and Its Development,\u201d College & Research Libraries <\/em>76, no. 3 (1986): 162. ↵<\/a><\/li>
  55. Mellon, \u201cLibrary Anxiety\u201d, 163. ↵<\/a><\/li>
  56. Sharon Lee Bostick, \u201cThe Development and Validation of the Library Anxiety Scale,\u201d PhD diss., (Wayne State University, 1992). ↵<\/a><\/li>
  57. Sullivan, \u201cWhy Librarians Can\u2019t,\u201d 1152 ↵<\/a><\/li><\/ol><\/div>","protected":false},"author":605,"menu_order":2,"template":"","meta":{"pb_show_title":"on","pb_short_title":"","pb_subtitle":"","pb_authors":[],"pb_section_license":""},"chapter-type":[],"contributor":[],"license":[],"class_list":["post-70","chapter","type-chapter","status-publish","hentry"],"part":3,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/pressbooks.library.torontomu.ca\/disinformationhandbook\/wp-json\/pressbooks\/v2\/chapters\/70","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/pressbooks.library.torontomu.ca\/disinformationhandbook\/wp-json\/pressbooks\/v2\/chapters"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/pressbooks.library.torontomu.ca\/disinformationhandbook\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/chapter"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/pressbooks.library.torontomu.ca\/disinformationhandbook\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/605"}],"version-history":[{"count":22,"href":"https:\/\/pressbooks.library.torontomu.ca\/disinformationhandbook\/wp-json\/pressbooks\/v2\/chapters\/70\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":192,"href":"https:\/\/pressbooks.library.torontomu.ca\/disinformationhandbook\/wp-json\/pressbooks\/v2\/chapters\/70\/revisions\/192"}],"part":[{"href":"https:\/\/pressbooks.library.torontomu.ca\/disinformationhandbook\/wp-json\/pressbooks\/v2\/parts\/3"}],"metadata":[{"href":"https:\/\/pressbooks.library.torontomu.ca\/disinformationhandbook\/wp-json\/pressbooks\/v2\/chapters\/70\/metadata\/"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/pressbooks.library.torontomu.ca\/disinformationhandbook\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=70"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"chapter-type","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/pressbooks.library.torontomu.ca\/disinformationhandbook\/wp-json\/pressbooks\/v2\/chapter-type?post=70"},{"taxonomy":"contributor","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/pressbooks.library.torontomu.ca\/disinformationhandbook\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/contributor?post=70"},{"taxonomy":"license","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/pressbooks.library.torontomu.ca\/disinformationhandbook\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/license?post=70"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}