{"id":34,"date":"2026-10-05T12:56:56","date_gmt":"2026-10-05T16:56:56","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/pressbooks.library.torontomu.ca\/rethinkingfoodsecurity\/chapter\/policy-instrument-considerations-for-food-system-change\/"},"modified":"2026-10-05T13:04:21","modified_gmt":"2026-10-05T17:04:21","slug":"policy-instrument-considerations-for-food-system-change","status":"publish","type":"chapter","link":"https:\/\/pressbooks.library.torontomu.ca\/rethinkingfoodsecurity\/chapter\/policy-instrument-considerations-for-food-system-change\/","title":{"raw":"4. Policy Instrument Considerations for Food System Change","rendered":"4. Policy Instrument Considerations for Food System Change"},"content":{"raw":"\n

Abstract<\/h2>\nGovernments use a wide range of policy instruments to shape markets, influence behaviour, establish legal frameworks, and advance public policy objectives. Although many policy instrument choices and designs can support food system transformation, Canadian governments have, since the end of the Second World War, relied on a relatively narrow range of approaches, particularly for food demand management. This chapter examines the classic dilemmas of policy instrument choice and design, exploring the trade-offs that influence effectiveness across a range of intervention strategies. It argues that meaningful food system transformation requires coherent mixes of complementary policy instruments tailored to complex social, environmental, and economic objectives, rather than reliance on isolated or voluntary measures. The chapter concludes by examining why Canadian food system interventions are frequently poorly designed and implemented, identifying the institutional, political, and organizational barriers that continue to limit effective policy execution and systems change.\n\nAcknowledgements and author notes<\/strong>: Some sections of this Chapter have been adapted from foodpolicyforcanada.info.yorku.ca<\/a>.\n

I - Introduction<\/h2>\nIn any country, governments and public policies have a central responsibility to ensure food security. Governments can use a range of instruments to advance their policy goals, and these instruments can have direct and indirect effects by influencing social norms, markets, and social structures (Buckingham, Hole, Glaholt, et al., 2014; Buckingham, Hole, Morin, et al., 2014; Lessig, 1998). Instruments are often interconnected, especially when governments want to generate policy coherence and substantial change. The presumption is that instrument mixes are necessary, complementary, and purposeful, involving multiple targets, multiple actors, and both direct and indirect effects. A coherent and comprehensive implementation of the 5As of food security (see Chapter 1 in this volume) clearly involves using multiple instruments in a coordinated way. Therefore, a fuller understanding of these instruments and their design features supports policy advocacy efforts.\n\nThis chapter introduces a discussion of the main policy instruments governments use to effect change. It invites the readers to consider how these instruments can and have been used to promote food system change in Canada and elsewhere. Section II provides an overview of trade-offs and difficulties in applying policy instruments. Section III offers a more detailed discussion of a cross-cutting feature of instrument choice - targeted or non-targeted approaches \u2013 to provide some concrete examples of the options for policymakers. The chapter closes with concluding thoughts on future policy approaches for Canadians (section IV).\n

II - Instrument Choice Considerations<\/h2>\nTable 1 provides a quick summary of key instrument choices governments can use.\n

Table 1: Instrument Choices<\/strong><\/h3>\n
\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n
Element<\/strong><\/th>\nNotes<\/strong><\/th>\n<\/tr>\n
Policy statements<\/td>\nUsually high-level statements, delivered or approved by members of governing parties. They set out policy goals but can, however, be more operational, and even very target-specific, with precise outputs, outcomes and timelines (Howlett, 2009)<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
Legislation<\/td>\nIn recent Canadian tradition, legislation is broad and enabling and is revised infrequently, yet change typically requires the creation of new legislation and\/or the modification of existing acts<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
Regulatory changes<\/td>\nSenior bureaucracies create regulations that provide additional guidance to legislation and draft regulatory amendments.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
Regulatory protocols and directives<\/td>\nHowever, because regulations are also relatively vague, agencies must develop detailed regulatory protocols and directives to guide day-to-day activities and decision-making.  These are not always public.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
Other instrument choices and changes<\/td>\nGovernments often use a range of other instruments, including programs, grants, educational mechanisms, and taxes or tax incentives, to support their policy statements, legislation, or regulations. When bundled together, they can be called a strategy or a plan.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
Structural changes<\/td>\nThe loci of decision-making often significantly affect how changes are made.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n<\/div>\n

Voluntary vs. Mandatory<\/strong><\/h3>\nVoluntary programs are typically more acceptable to those being targeted. In theory, buy-in for these programs is higher, but voluntary programs generally attract those who have already moved significantly in the direction the program identifies. Those who usually contribute most to the problem or suffer most from the phenomenon are less likely to participate. Uptake rates can be high but do not necessarily engage a high percentage of the priority actors. If the instrument provides benefits beyond the individual participant (referred to in economics as non-excludable), the \"free rider\" problem arises: non-participants receive benefits without participating and often do not pay for them. Canada favours voluntary programs and awareness-building instruments such as the Environmental Farm Plan programs.\n\nMandatory programs, in contrast, involve all targeted actors, but participation usually faces significant resistance, and some actors actively try to \"work around\" the rules. Well-designed mandatory measures have historically helped to reshape the rules by which society functions, and actors adjust to those changes. The wider scope of these initiatives often leads to more fairness and faster rates of change because they involve the most reluctant or those most in need. Consequently, it is usually more expensive.\n

Contribution Agreements and Grants vs. Other Financial Supports<\/strong><\/h3>\nContribution agreements and grants (commonly referred to as grants) are the dominant approach to program funding in the Canadian food system, practised by governments and private-sector donors. For governments, contribution agreements and grants have become more popular during the era of free trade agreements because they are generally viewed as less trade-distorting and disruptive of market forces than other financing instruments. They are often competitive, voluntary, and application-based; frequently include cost-sharing arrangements with other food system actors, including recipients; and do not necessarily require ongoing financial commitments (one-offs). Several of the funding programs under Canada\u2019s National Food Policy fall into this category, including the Local Food Infrastructure Fund.\n\nHowever, this also means they are not very targeted, do not necessarily address significant problems (few applications come from those most contributing to a negative situation), are not very tenable for long-term complex challenges, and their impacts are scattershot and not necessarily well identified. Cost-share arrangements usually favour those who already have resources and might even be able to undertake the work without the grant. Changes associated with grants can be temporary and lost when the contribution ends. Application procedures are typically onerous, as are reporting requirements, often taking disproportionate amounts of an organization's time and resources.\n

Constrained vs. Free Choice<\/strong><\/h3>\nRelated to voluntary vs. mandatory, constrained and free choice are frequently considered in farm support programs. As private landowners, many farmers believe they should be able to do what they want on their land. Constrained choice has two different streams: dominant vs ecological. The dominant model, which most policies and programs have been designed to support, constrains choices through both economic relations (e.g., contracts that favour processors or retailers over farmers, often prescribing which management practices to follow) and narratives that define what good farming is. Choice can also be constrained by competing conventional institutional logics; essentially, once farmers are deeply reliant on a wide array of institutions to sustain their farming operations (a key part of the dominant approach is to reduce farm self-reliance and increase dependency), then competing rules imposed by these institutions narrow the management options of farmers (see also Baur, 2020; Hendrickson & James, 2005, 2016).\n\nIn contrast, ecological systems apply choice constraints in different ways. They discourage or prevent certain dominant practices and economic relations, but require different ecological systems to be implemented (with a transition period). Within those systems, producers can adapt requirements to each operation's circumstances, but they are not free to do whatever they want.\n

Performance vs. Practice<\/strong><\/h3>\nPerformance-based supports reward documented improvements in the phenomena to be addressed (e.g., pollution reduction, economic activity, social equity). Practice-based supports reward actors for adopting practices likely to improve performance, though these improvements are rarely measured. For example, only a small number of studies have evaluated whether best management practices with fertilizer actually reduce fertilizer use over the long term. More problematically, many conclude they do not, and some argue that the consequence is that overall fertilizer use increases (Houser, 2022). Some believe that performance-based instruments are better; however, certain conditions must be in place for them to be viable and cost-effective. According to the Wallace Center (2003), these include:\n