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Chapter 1: In all he does man seeks same good as end or means.
Chapter 2: THE end is THE good; our subject is this and its science Politics.
Chapter 3: Exactness not permitted by subject nor to be expected by student, who needs experience and training.
Chapter 4: Men agree that the good is happiness, but differ as to what this is.
Chapter 5: The good cannot be pleasure, nor honour, nor virtue.
Chapter 6: Various arguments to show against the Platonists that there cannot be one universal good.
Chapter 7: The good is the final end, and happiness is this.
Chapter 8: This view harmonizes various current views.
Chapter 9: It happiness acquired, or the gift of Gods or of chance?
Chapter 10: Can no man be called happy during life?
Chapter 11: Cannot the fortunes of survivors affect the dead?
Chapter 12: Happiness as absolute end is above praise.
Chapter 13: Division of the faculties and resulting division of the virtues.
Chapter 1: Moral virtue is acquired by the repetition of the corresponding acts.
Chapter 2: These acts must be such as reason prescribes; they can’t be defined exactly, but must be neither too much nor too little.
Chapter 3: Virtue is in various ways concerned with pleasure and pain.
Chapter 4: The conditions of virtuous action as distinct from artistic production.
Chapter 5: Virtue not an emotion, nor a faculty, but a trained faculty or habit.
Chapter 6: Viz., the habit of choosing the mean.
Chapter 7: This must be applied to the several virtues.
Chapter 8: The two vicious extremes are opposed to one another and to the intermediate virtue.
Chapter 9: The mean hard to hit, and is a matter of perception, not of reasoning.
Chapter 1: An act is involuntary when done (a) under compulsion, or (b) through ignorance: (a) means not originated by doer,(b) means through ignorance of the circumstances: voluntary then means originated with knowledge of circumstances.
Chapter 2: Purpose, a mode of will, means choice after deliberation.
Chapter 3: We deliberate on what we can do—not on ends, but means.
Chapter 4: We wish for
Chapter 5: Virtue and vice are alike voluntary, our acts are our own; for we are punished for them; if this be our character, we have made it by repeated acts; even bodily vices are blamable when thus formed. We cannot plead that our notion of good depends on our nature; for (1) vice would still be as voluntary as virtue, (2) we help to make ourselves what we are.
Chapter 6: Of courage and the opposite vices.
Chapter 7
Chapter 8: Of courage improperly so called.
Chapter 9: How courage involves both pain and pleasure.
Chapter 10: Of temperance.
Chapter 11
Chapter 12: How profligacy is more voluntary than cowardice.
Chapter 1: Of liberality.
Chapter 2: Of magnificence.
Chapter 3: Of high-mindedness
Chapter 4: Of a similar virtue in smaller matters.
Chapter 5: Of gentleness.
Chapter 6: Of agreeableness.
Chapter 7: Of truthfulness.
Chapter 8: Of wittiness.
Chapter 9: Of the feeling of shame
Chapter 1: Preliminary Two senses of justice distinguished justice (l) = obedience to law = complete virtue.
Chapter 2: Of justice (2) = fairness, how related to justice (1). What is just in distribution distinguished from what is just in correction.
Chapter 3: Of what is just in ditribution and its rule of geometrical proportion.
Chapter 4: Of that which is just in correction, and its rule of arithmetical proportion.
Chapter 5: Simple requital is not identical with what is just, but proportionate requital is what is just in exchange; and this is effected by means of money. We can now give a general definition of justice (2).
Chapter 6: (One can act unjustly without being unjust.) That which is just in the strict sense is between citizens only, for it implies law.
Chapter 7: It is in part natural, in part conventional.
Chapter 8: The internal conditions of a just or unjust action, and of a just or unjust agent.
Chapter 9: Sundry questions about doing and suffering injustice
Chapter 10: Of equity
Chapter 11: Can a man wrong himself?
Chapter 1: Must be studied because (a) reason prescribes the mean,(b) they are a part of human excellence. The intellect is (1) scientific, (2) calculative: we want the virtue of each.
Chapter 2: The function of the intellect, both in practice and speculation, is to attain truth.
Chapter 3: Of the five modes of attaining truth: (1) of demonstrative science of things invariable.
Chapter 4: Of knowledge of things variable, viz. (2) of art in what we make;
Chapter 5: and (3) of prudence in what we do, the virtue of the calculative intellect.
Chapter 6: (4) Of intuitive reason as the basis of demonstrative science.
Chapter 7: (5) Of wisdom as the union of science and intuitive reason. Comparison of the two intellectual virtues, wisdom and prudence.
Chapter 8: Prudence compared with statesmanship and other forms of knowledge.
Chapter 9: Of deliberation.
Chapter 10: Of intelligence
Chapter 11: Of judgment Of reason or intuitive perception as the basis of the practical intellect.
Chapter 12: Of the uses of wisdom and prudence. How prudence is related to cleverness.
Chapter 13: How prudence is related to moral virtue
Chapter 1: Of continence and incontinence, heroic virtue and brutality. Of method. Statement of opinions about continence.
Chapter 2: Statement of difficulties as to how one can know right and do wrong.
Chapter 3: Solution: to know has many senses; in what sense such a man knows.
Chapter 4: Of incontinence in the strict and in the metaphorical sense.
Chapter 5: Of incontinence in respect of brutal or morbid appetites.
Chapter 6: Incontinence in anger less blamed than in appetite.
Chapter 7: Incontinence yields to pleasure, softness to pain. Two kinds of incontinence, the hasty and the weak.
Chapter 8: Incontinence compared with vice and virtue.
Chapter 9: Continence and incontinence not identical with keeping and breaking a resolution.
Chapter 10: Prudence is not, but cleverness is, compatible with incontinence.
Chapter 11: We must now discuss pleasure. Opinions about it.
Chapter 12: Answers to arguments against goodness of pleasure. Ambiguity of good and pleasant. Pleasure not a transition, but unimpeded activity.
Chapter 13: Pleasure is good, and the pleasure that consists in the highest activity is the good. All admit that happiness is pleasant. Bodily pleasures not the only pleasures.
Chapter 14: Of the bodily pleasures, and the distinction between naturally and accidentally pleasant.
Chapter 1: Uses of friendship. Differences of opinion about it.
Chapter 2: Three motives of friendship. Friendship defined.
Chapter 3: Three kinds of friendship, corresponding to the three motives Perfect friendship is that whose motive is the good.
Chapter 4: The others are imperfect copies of this.
Chapter 5: Intercourse necessary to the maintenance of friendship.
Chapter 6: Impossible to have many true friends.
Chapter 7: Of friendship between unequal persons and its rule of proportion. Limits within which this is possible.
Chapter 8: Of loving and being loved.
Chapter 9: Every society has its own form of friendship as of justice. All societies are summed up in civil society.
Chapter 10: Of the three forms of constitution.
Chapter 11: Of the corresponding forms of friendship.
Chapter 12: Of the friendship of kinsmen and comrades.
Chapter 13: Of the terms of interchange and quarrels hence arising in equal friendships.
Chapter 14: Of the same in unequal friendships.
Chapter 1: Of the rule of proportion in dissimilar friendships.
Chapter 2: Of the conflict of duties.
Chapter 3: Of the dissolution of friendships.
Chapter 4: A man’s relation to his friend like his relation to himself.
Chapter 5: Friendship and goodwill.
Chapter 6: Friendship and unanimity
Chapter 7: Why benefactors love more than they are loved.
Chapter 8: In what sense it is right to love one’s self.
Chapter 9: Why a happy man needs friends.
Chapter 10: Of the proper number of friends.
Chapter 11: Friends needed both in prosperity and adversity.
Chapter 12: Friendship is realized in living together.
Chapter 1: Reasons for discussing pleasure.
Chapter 2: Arguments of Eudoxus that pleasure is the good.
Chapter 3: Argument that it is not a quality; that it is not determined; that it is a motion or coming into being. Pleasures differ in kind.
Chapter 4: Pleasure defined: its relation to activity.
Chapter 5: Pleasures differ according to the activities The standard is the good man.
Chapter 6: Happiness not amusement, but life.
Chapter 7: Of the speculative life as happiness in the highest sense.
Chapter 8: Of the practical life as happiness in a lower sense, and of the relation between the two. Prosperity, how far needed.
Chapter 9: How is the end to be realized?
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